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CORRESPONDENCE 
Moral Discourse and Family Law 
Lee E. Teitelbaum* 
Inaugurating the Michigan Law Review's "Correspondence" section, 
Professor Teitelbaum comments on Carl E. Schneider's Moral Discourse 
and the Transformation of American Family Law, published in the Au-
gust 1985 issue of this Review. The editors invite contributions to "Corre-
spondence" in the form of brief comments on legal scholarship recently 
published here or elsewhere. 
It seems appropriate in the early stages of an experiment in legal 
publishing to say something about it, if only because few forms have 
been as resistant to innovation as the law review. The creation of a 
section for correspondence regarding recent articles provides a me-
dium for conducting just the national discourse which scholarship as-
pires to provoke and which does occur in private conversations or 
letters and, occasionally, in panels at professional meetings. To talk in 
print about a colleague's work - to praise it, qualify it, pursue sug-
gested or alternate lines of thought - is not only an enjoyable thing to 
do but promises to facilitate more focused interchanges of ideas and 
research than has previously been possible. 
What I have to say about Carl Schneider's elegant Moral Discourse 
and the Transformation of American Family Law 1 wanders down sev-
eral of the avenues mentioned above. The first thing is to praise it. 
Professor Schneider sets out to examine a familiar phenomenon in a 
new way, and this he does clearly and persuasively. His principal the-
sis can be stated simply enough. A major transformation in American 
family law has taken place over the last two decades, which is charac-
terized by two related developments: a diminution of "moral dis-
course" and a transfer of responsibility "from the law to the people the 
law once regulated." This transformation can be seen in virtually 
every sub-domain of domestic relations. Looking first at discourse, 
courts no longer talk in terms of spousal fault as they dissolve mar-
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; on leave from University of New 
Mexico Law School. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard University; LL.M. 1968, Northwestern 
University. - Ed. As evidence of the interchanges promoted by this forum, the author wishes to 
thank Professors Leslie Francis, Russell Goodman, and Hendrik Hartog for their gentle but 
infinitely helpful comments on this piece. 
1. 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). 
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riages; child custody determinations no longer express the moral fit-
ness of parents; "moral neglect" rarely now serves as a basis for 
custodial decisions. This shift in the terms of discussion is associated 
with a change in the locus of responsibility for decision. Whereas law 
once defined the obligations of spouses, husbands and wives now are 
substantially free to end and, to a lesser degree, to arrange the terms of 
their marriages. While courts and agencies once felt confident in rely-
ing on their judgments regarding what "good" and "moral" parents 
should do for their children, those "value judgments" now seem insen-
sitive to non-middle-class families. And, of course, procreative issues 
are now generally regarded as matters for individual, rather than com-
munity or even family, determination. 
Professor Schneider seeks to explain these developments by refer-
ence to four forces which have shaped family law in this country: a 
legal tradition of noninterference in the household; an ideological 
commitment to liberal individualism; a social experience of changing 
moral beliefs; and the immanent appearance of "psychologic man." It 
is impossible to trace here the detailed support Professor Schneider 
adduces for his thesis. What may be useful is to emphasize one or two 
further themes regarding the recent history of the family, perhaps to 
add a voice to his call for further theoretical and interdisciplinary 
work in this field. 
There is, I think, no reason to doubt Professor Schneider's central 
observations: that both rules of family law and talk by courts and 
legislatures about family law have changed dramatically and, as these 
things go, suddenly. Moreover, that change seems associated with a 
diminution of "moral discourse," meaning the frank invocation by 
courts of value-laden language to justify both doctrine and particular 
results. 
I do not understand Professor Schneider to say, however, that the 
diminution in moral discourse by courts and public officials reflects a 
wholesale abandonment of morality. Rather, it seems to follow from 
the abandonment of a moral theory to which the use of expressly mor-
alistic language is especially suited. Until several decades into this 
century, discussions of family law and structure seemed to rely upon a 
teleological framework, according to which each "thing" has a goal or 
purpose and it is the goal of each thing to be or act consistently with 
the distinctive characteristics or functions of its kind. This was, for 
Aristotle, true of professions as well as things, and the goodness of a 
course of conduct is determined by its consistency with the purpose or 
nature of the thing, activity, or relationship to which it is directed. In 
the simplest case, the function of a watch is to keep time; to make a 
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good watch is to make a watch that keeps time accurately. The func-
tion of medicine is health; good medical practice or a good doctor is 
one which achieves that goal. Not only things and professions but 
relationships can be treated in the same way. Friendships are of vari-
ous kinds, but Aristotle assumed that the characteristics of each can 
be identified and the goodness of practices evaluated accordingly. The 
undesirability of having a large number of good friends flows from the 
special characteristics of friendship, which include the sharing of life 
together, the sharing of sympathy, and the mutual relationships of 
one's friends among each other as well as with oneself. Because it is 
not possible, Aristotle concluded, to distribute oneself among many 
people, nor to sympathize sincerely with the joys and pains of many 
people, nor for one's friends (if they are many) to pass all their time 
together, that course of conduct should be avoided.2 
Although a teleological view talks in terms of functions, those 
functions occur more or less naturally, like the beating of a heart, or 
are the product of reason; they express the essence of a thing, activity, 
or relationship. These seem to be the terms in which family relation-
ships were evaluated until recently. A "good family" was determined 
by reference to the characteristics of families; a "good husband" was 
known by the consistency of his conduct with the functions of hus-
bands. Nineteenth-century cases and commentary frankly defined 
these propositions by direct reference to natural law and to a Christian 
understanding of marriage and the family. Bishop's treatise on Mar-
riage and Divorce, for example, declares that the source of marriage, 
understood as "one man and one woman legally united for life," lies in 
"the law of nature, whence it has flowed into the municipal laws of 
every civilized country .... "3 In Reynolds v. United States, 4 the 
Supreme Court condemned plural marriage because of its inconsis-
tency with the function of the family in western society: 
Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits 
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which gov-
ernment is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monoga-
mous and polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles 
on which the government of the people ... rests. Professor Lieber says, 
polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and [sic] which, when ap· 
plied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, 
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.5 
2. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. IX, ch. 10 (J.A.K. Thompson trans. 1953). 
3. J. BISHOP, CoMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE§ 29 (Boston 
1852). 
4. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
5. 98 U.S. at 165-66. 
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This passage seems in some respects modem, particularly in its invoca-
tion of the social scientific authority of Professor Francis Lieber. In-
deed, this citation has been described as an "early and unheralded use 
of social science findings."6 However, Professor Lieber's own views 
were consistent with a teleological theory of marriage, for which com-
parative experience served primarily as confirmation. Monogamy, in 
his view, 
is one of the primordial elements out of which all law proceeds . . .. 
Wedlock, or monogamic marriage, . . . is one of the frames of our 
thoughts, and moulds of our feelings; it is a psychological condition of 
our jural consciousness, of our liberty, of our literature, of our aspira-
tions, of our religious convictions, ... the foundation of all that is called 
polity.7 
The Supreme Court's acceptance of this view can be seen even later 
when it reiterated in a subsequent Mormon case that "The organiza-
tion of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy . . . is 
contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which 
Christianity has produced in the Western world. " 8 
Roles within, as well as the constitution of, marriage were under-
stood by reference to the same framework in nineteenth-century cases. 
The now notorious opinion of Justice Bradley, sustaining an Illinois 
decision denying women access to the practice of law, observed that: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman .... 
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the di-
vine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic 
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood. 9 
As for unmarried women, they are regarded as exceptional cases, and 
"the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution 
of things .... " 10 
Much the same sense emerges from judicial discourse, still com-
mon enough, which invokes the "status" aspect of marriage and the 
family. We are all accustomed to Maine's theory of legal and social 
progress, according to which the development in social organization 
6. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L. REv. 
217, 232. 
7. [Lieber], The Mormons. Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 PUTNAM'S MONTHLY 
225, 234 (1855), quoted in Weisbrod & Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth·Cen-
tury Forms of Marriage and the Status of Women, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 828, 835 (1978). 
8. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
49 (1890). 
9. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
10. 83 U.S. at 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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from a patriarchal, family-centered style to a mode in which individu-
als are the locus of rights and duties is reflected in the shift in legal 
thought from status to contract. 11 Yet until recently, and to some ex-
tent still, judges relied upon a theory that supposes that the character-
istics of the family are given rather than individually or even locally 
determined. 
As Professor Schneider observes, it is hard now to read the lan-
guage of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases without embar-
rassment, and its appearance even in current casebooks has much to 
do with the marginality of family law at many schools. Contract and 
tort cases, even in the nineteenth century, rarely talk in terms of Chris-
tian ideals of responsibility or natural law principles of obligation, 
much less in terms of status; tax cases never do. 
This is, in itself, an interesting thing, which cannot be pursued in 
detail here. Why is it that the discourse of family law, which I take to 
reflect a teleological view of morality, was unblushingly employed in 
domestic relations but not in other areas of law? Professor Schneider 
suggests some answers to this question, among them the salience in 
domestic relations law of obligations to others and the particular rele-
vance of a core meaning of morality - that is, sexual morality. These 
are surely imaginative and plausible conjectures, but not - and not 
intended to be - exhaustive. Contracts and torts, after all, could also 
be regarded as relational matters. Indeed much ancient and much 
current thinking is directed to just that view. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, notions of economic utility rather than moral 
obligation dominated legal talk in these areas, and the resulting em-
phasis on leaving parties to define their relationships contrasts sharply 
with the emphasis in family law on the public role in defining the char-
acteristics and functions of domestic relationships. 
What has diminished, over time and variously across sub-domains 
of family law, is a view that the family has certain characteristics and 
functions, universal at least within our culture, against which the 
goodness of behavior and rules can be measured. Professor Schneider 
has identified four forces which contributed to its disappearance, and I 
would add three. One of these was the ambiguity of republican polit-
ical and social theory. 12 A teleological framework suited the early 
nineteenth-century effort to create a theory of free citizenship, when 
freedom was largely understood in terms of possession of a domain. 
Relegation of women to a "natural" domestic sphere confirmed the 
11. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (2d ed. 1864). 
12. I am indebted to Hendrik Hartog for this suggestion. 
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dependent relationship essential to the male householder's claim to cit-
izenship in the external political community. However, a complete 
subordination of women to men also seemed morally wrong in republi-
can eyes; wives have never been regarded in this country as slaves or 
incompetents. Nineteenth-century discourse thus came to insist upon 
the equality and even the superiority of women within the household, a 
view which may have suspended the sense of ambiguity but carried 
within it the seeds of more general egalitarian talk about rights. 
A second force, which came to function interactively with the first, 
might be called a sense of social realism, for lack of a better term. The 
teleological framework depended on universal characteristics and 
functions associated with marriage and the family, premises which 
were impeached by apparent changes in the family over the course of 
the nineteenth century. Colonial families were conceived as extensions 
of the larger community and the principal foci of economic production 
and consumption, of education and discipline of the young, and of 
social activities. By the turn of this century, urban families undertook 
virtually no economic productive activities, education had been 
mandatorily committed to public agencies, and socialization beyond 
the tender years of youth came to seem more a function of peers and 
schools than of parents. 
Such changes in social conditions made teleological assumptions 
seem at best romantic and at worst anachronistic. How can we say 
that a "good family" is one which educates its children well, when 
most of the responsibility for education lies outside the family and, 
moreover, professional educators deny the capacity of parents gener-
ally to discharge that function? Can we say, as both colonial and nine-
teenth-century opinion did, that a "good wife" is one who manages the 
household economy efficiently wh~n most consumer goods are now 
produced outside the household and when substantial numbers of 
married women are employed outside the home? 
The process by which this change in perspective occurred warrants 
more extended examination than has yet been done. Some of the per-
ceived changes were "real," in the sense that they were observable ef-
fects of industrialization and urbanization. The decline of domestic 
economic production and the increase in female employment outside 
the home are two such effects. The fact of changed patterns of con-
duct, however, does not itself explain why courts and legislatures 
chose to incorporate these developments into their normative frame-
work rather than to regret them or condemn them as deviant. A par-
tial answer may lie in the circumstance that some of these changes 
were sponsored by the same groups which shifted the framework of 
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family discourse. Commitment of education to professionals was an 
officially supported alteration in family function, congruent with the 
aspirations and claims to expertise of those same professionals. Much 
the same can be said of the assumption by juvenile courts and other 
socio-legal agencies of responsibility for dealing with deviance. It was 
an essential aspect of this social realism that families were not consid-
ered generally capable under modern conditions of discharging func-
tions traditionally assigned to them. Thus, family function came to be 
regarded as a social construction founded on empirical bases rather 
than as the product of nature or reason. 
A third source of change was the assumption by courts throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of general authority over family 
matters. Feminist and popular literature frequently invoked the "nat-
ural capacity" of mothers for child-rearing against common-law pater-
nal rights, and courts often enough employed similar language. 
However, legal standards did not merely substitute one teleology for 
another, but from the early part of the nineteenth century relied upon 
judgments regarding the child's "best interests," understood partly as 
an empirical question. The empirical aspect of this issue is revealed by 
the incidence of cases in which courts declared the natural superiority 
of women as nurturers but, under the circumstances, determined to 
place custody elsewhere. tJ 
As the premises of the teleological view weakened, a new basis for 
family law rules was needed. The development of that basis surely did 
not occur in a linear or conscious fashion. It was worked by a multi-
plicity of courts and judges, most of whom did not address directly the 
moral philosophical premises of the doctrines they were creating or 
replacing. Characteristics and goals were talked about as if they were 
natural, but some sense of qualification and contingency nonetheless 
played a part. Professor Schneider, with considerable justification, 
identifies the ultimate successor to teleology as John Stuart Mill's 
amalgamation of utilitarianism and rights theory. On this view, the 
goodness of rules or conduct is not determined affirmatively, by their 
fitness for some articulated function, but negatively, according to the 
probability that they will cause harm to others. The problems with 
reconciling utilitarianism with rights theory are familiar and produce 
much of the tension now felt in family law. To a utilitarian, nothing is 
sacrosanct as long as the long-term consequences are beneficial. This 
aspect of current discourse is plainly revealed by the emphasis one 
finds on the empirical effects thought to be associated with family law 
13. See M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE· 
TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 248-53 (1985). 
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and policy. Rights theory, however, usually supposes a "space" 
around the individual. This space has a special claim to respect not 
well accounted for in utilitarian approaches, and it is this aspect of 
post-teleological theory which seems to be reflected in cases and com-
mentary that emphasize "family autonomy" and "family privacy." 
The combination of empiricism and rights talk bears considerable 
responsibility, I suspect, for the remarkable volatility which has char-
acterized family law for the last two decades. While empiricism might 
imply stagnation rather than radical change, it is most likely to do so 
when there exists some convincing support for traditional rules which 
must then be overcome by equally convincing evidence. And, 
although family law discussions routinely make empirical claims, little 
reliable data exist to support those claims. On reflection, this state of 
affairs is hardly surprising. Classical research through experimental 
testing of hypotheses about custodial arrangements, marital dissolu-
tion, alimony, and most other questions of public importance is simply 
impossible. Random assignment of children to one or another parent, 
or the random granting and denial of divorce petitions, is neither con-
stitutionally nor socially acceptable. Second-choice methodologies, 
such as quasi-experimental research, are only relatively less difficult. 
The issues covered by family law are so complex, the populations in-
volved so large and diverse, and the effects potentially so variable over 
time, that only massive longitudinal research sensitive to a vast 
number of variables could hope to yield defensible results. The most 
usual empirical approach, some form of post-hoc reconstruction of ef-
fects, is in all events a problematic undertaking and surely provides a 
shaky basis for policy decisions of immense importance. 
Absence of data is particularly likely to result in change when that 
change is founded on claims of individual rights. The burden is on 
those who would restrict such claims, and that burden cannot con-
vincingly be discharged. So family law develops as a continuing natu-
ral experiment, in which rules result from value-based preferences for 
one claimed set of effects or another. 
Lest this seem cynical, and it is not meant to be, consider as one 
instance the recent history of child custody laws. Until perhaps fifteen 
years ago, it was widely agreed that wise custodial policy included a 
preference for maternal custody, disfavor or prohibition of joint and 
divided custodial arrangements, and refusal to place a child with a 
parent who displayed atypical sexual preferences. Recent justifica-
tions have been largely empirical in tone. Goldstein, Freud, and 
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Solnit14 emphasized the importance of continuity to the emotional de-
velopment of children, which was interpreted to support placement of 
the child with the parent with whom he or she had formed the strong-
est bond. Typically, this was the mother. Emphasis on continuity also 
served to justify disfavor for joint and divided custodial arrangements, 
which were seen as threatening the stable living arrangements and 
emotional ties necessary to the young child's development. Antipathy 
to placement of children with parents who displayed atypical sexual 
preferences often rested on a prediction about the effects on the child 
of exposure to those practices, although it is surely also true that some 
sense of "unfitness" in some or even many instances founded or sup-
ported that prediction.1s 
All of these hypotheses are plausible. They have nevertheless been 
replaced, in some or even many jurisdictions, by contrary or different 
suppositions about the world. In many states, the maternal preference 
has disappeared. Although state Equal Rights Amendments and their 
implications contributed substantially to this development, so did 
claims that fathers can also be fine caretakers of children. Indeed, fa-
thers' rights groups commonly take just that position in urging equal 
treatment for custodial purposes. Joint custody is now permitted in a 
number of jurisdictions and is formally regarded as preferable in 
some.16 Proponents of this change have typically denied that con-
tinuity within a household is indispensable and urged that shared legal 
responsibility will encourage both parents to retain significant relation-
ships with their children.17 And, of course, the import of atypical sex-
ual preferences has diminished in a number of jurisdictions.18 
These substitute hypotheses are also plausible. Neither the set of 
beliefs supporting traditional rules, nor that supporting family law 
change, rests upon reliable research bases. There is, true enough, evi-
dence supporting the benefits of joint custody, but there is also re-
search and opinion to the contrary.19 Some expert opinion indicates 
14. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OP THE CHILD 
(1979). 
15. See generally Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and 
Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691 (1976). 
16. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5 (West Supp. 1986). 
17. See, e.g .. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT 
CUSTODY (1978). 
18. Courts in at least eleven states have held that sexual orientation per sc does not justify 
denial of custody or visitation privileges to gay parents. However, the implementation of this 
principle remains hard to evaluate. See Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the 
Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 497, 515-46 (1984). 
19. See Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the 
Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 739 (1983). 
'I' 
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that atypical sexual preferences are just that, while other expert opin-
ion considers those preferences to reflect a maladjustment for which 
treatment is appropriate.20 
It has already been suggested that the volatility of family law doc-
trine, of which custody doctrine is but one instance, results in part 
from a discourse that relies on empirical claims which cannot authori-
tatively be proved. There is more to the story than that, however. 
The unavailability of data to support empirical assumptions upon 
which rules are founded is hardly unique to family law. Commercial 
law presumes the existence of various attitudes and behaviors on the 
parts of both merchants and consumers, for which little or no evidence 
exists or has been sought. Who knows whether consumers care about 
warranties when they buy cigarette lighters, or whether they read their 
contracts? Criminal law, for its part, talks routinely in deterrence 
terms, although the tenuousness of claims of this sort has been thor-
oughly explored. Perhaps wrongly, these areas do not produce the 
sense of anchorlessness which pervades discourse in family law. 
The special discomfort we experience in domestic relations is asso-
ciated, I think, with the lack of obvious fit between both utilitarian and 
rights talk and our sense of the family. The utilitarian approach seems 
unsatisfying not only because the data it supposes are unavailable, but 
because its application ordinarily permits only negative statements. In 
Mill's formulation, what is good is determined not by constitutive 
goals but by the absence of harm to others, and in practice it is far 
easier to talk about what is wrong to do in families than what is right 
to do. It does not seem enough, however, to content ourselves with 
saying only that some rule cannot be shown to produce evil. While 
that may suffice for a commercial contract or the occasional tort, there 
is some feeling that family relationships should be founded on rules 
and practices we can call good. 
Nor does rights theory satisfy this longing. As Professor Schneider 
observes, we have a long and profound commitment to liberal princi-
ples and particularly to individualism, which can conveniently (if per-
haps quite wrongly) be incorporated in many areas of law. We can 
think of contracts as the products of individual wills rather than as 
primarily relational in nature. We can think of torts in much the same 
way, focusing on the notion of individualized culpability. 
20. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of approved 
mental disorders in 1973, by a vote of 5854 in favor, 3810 opposed, and 367 abstentions. Hunter 
& Polikoff, supra note 15, at 726 n.137. Nonetheless, expert witnesses and courts often regard, at 
least implicitly, homosexual preferences or conduct as deviant. See Comment, supra note 18, at 
515-46. 
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It is also true, of course, that talk of "family autonomy" and "fam-
ily privacy," which invokes categories familiar in rights theory, now 
appears with some frequency in casebooks and court decisions. How-
ever, that is not an easy way to think of families, and the fact that 
there is some real movement in both torts and contracts away from 
strictly individualistic theories makes their invocation in family law 
peculiarly uncomfortable. Use of such categories requires that the 
family be treated as a unit or entity, rather like the corporation or the 
state. To some extent, that treatment is plausible, because what we 
regard as a family is not in fact naturally occurring but socially cre-
ated. People who live together are roommates or families not accord-
ing to universal characteristics but according to the operation of 
socially created rules. 
Nonetheless, notions like family autonomy or family privacy are 
artificial and misleading. While the family is not a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, it is also not an entity. To speak of it in that way is a 
fiction we use to discuss things which, truth be told, do not fit within 
our theory. The fictive character of this discourse is revealed by even a 
quick glance at the meaning of decisions which rely upon it. Courts 
typically justify refusal to review the financial and other relations of 
spouses in an existing marriage on the ground that doing so would 
invade the right of the parties to work out their own roles within the 
marriage. When, however, one spouse (usually the husband) owns or 
manages all of the property, the plain effect of nonintervention is au-
tonomy for him and him alone. It is unclear how one could say that 
either the wife or the family is made autonomous by the court's inac-
tion. Similarly, when a court invalidates a statute declaring that at-
tendance at parochial school will not satisfy compulsory education 
requirements, it empowers parents to ·choose their child's educational 
setting but does not empower the child in any way, nor take into ac-
count the relationship between the child and the parent. And when a 
court holds that to require a hearing prior to parental commitment of 
a child as mentally retarded would constitute "statist" intervention in 
the family, the result is to allow the parents (with some professional 
agreement) to take such action as they wish. Neither the child nor the 
family is made or left autonomous by such a decision.21 
In these cases, as well as in the abortion cases which empower wo-
men but certainly not their parents or even the progenitor of the fetus, 
there is talk about family relationships and even speculation about the 
effect of the decision upon those relationships. However, the legal is-
21. For a more extended analysis, see Teitelbaum, Family History a11d Family Law, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 1135. 
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sues are understood in sharply restricted and individualistic terms, and 
the results, as we have seen, ultimately confer upon or confirm the 
power of one or another member of the family. Family relationships 
may be seen as a limitation upon a grant of power to that member, as 
was argued in the abortion cases, but the member always stands apart 
from the relationship. 
Like Professor Schneider, I am not suggesting that we should go 
back to the ancien regime in family law. He says, quite rightly, that 
you cannot go home again, and if you could you would not like it. 
The romantic images of the colonial family seem romantic only at a 
safe remove from indenture and the stocks. Nor is it sensible to claim 
functions for the family that have plainly disappeared under current 
economic, social, and political conditions. It is equally plain, however, 
that rights talk has not provided a satisfactory basis for discourse 
about the family. This, as much as any other circumstance, justifies 
the broad agenda for research in family law which Professor Schneider 
proposes. It is essential to consider how we can talk about families as 
relationships. A revised teleological view, directed to functions and 
characteristics we now value in those relationships, may provide one 
way of thinking about these questions. This approach may have the 
virtue of reintegrating individuals and those with whom they deal, by 
judging the rightness of particular conduct in terms of a universalistic 
framework. It may also be that other conceptualizations will emerge 
which will deal successfully with our sense of families as social con-
structs that are neither simply collections of independent actors nor 
simply metaphysical entities. Only through some such act of imagina-
tion can we talk again about families in ways that make sense. 
